

SPEECH

C. W. M.

47

OF

1788 - 1853.

Alexander

MR. DUNCAN, OF OHIO,

ON THE

BILL TO AUTHORIZE THE ISSUE OF TREASURY NOTES;

DELIVERED

IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 26, 1840.

WASHINGTON:

PRINTED AT THE GLOBE OFFICE.

1840.

105172

105172

105172

SPEECH.

In the House of Representatives, March 26, 1840—In Committee of the Whole, on the bill to authorize the issue of Treasury notes.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It was my intention to have let the Opposition do all the talking on this measure, but such has been the spread of misrepresentation of facts, prejudicial to the Administration and all its measures, for political effect, that it becomes my duty, in justice to myself, to make a few remarks, by way of defence. When the Administration is broadly and unqualifiedly denounced in every Federal Whig speech made here, as the most corrupt of corruptions, and all its measures as leading to the overthrow of this Government and the destruction of the people's best interests, it becomes a duty—which every member here owes to himself, who is a supporter of the Administration and its measures and principles—to repel such charges. It is in the exercise of this duty I will ask your attention for a short time, as well as to discharge an obligation I feel myself under to the Administration.

The bill now under consideration is one for the relief of the Government. Its very title and the necessity of its existence ought to rally every patriot to its support. What has superinduced its necessity? I answer, the unhappy connection of the Government with the banks. In May, 1837, the banks stopped payment with upwards of thirty millions of the public revenue in their possession, and left the Government without a dollar to perform its fiscal operations. As a matter of necessity the President called Congress for the purpose of devising ways and means by which the wheels of Government might continue to roll. Congress met. What was to be done? The banks set the Government and all its laws at defiance. The Government held bonds against our importing merchants to the amount of fourteen millions; but no relief was found in this resource, for the banks owned the merchants. I say, what was to be done? Nothing but to use the credit of the Government. How was that to be used? But two plans presented themselves. The one was the issue of Treasury notes to the amount of the wants of the Government, or to apply to the moneyed aristocracy of Europe for a loan. The former was adopted—the entire Democracy voting for and sustaining it against the entire Federal party, who were in favor of the latter.

The act then passed to authorize the issue of Treasury notes, has once or twice been renewed since, from the same necessity, and that is the object of the present bill. I herewith submit an extract from the Treasurer's report, which will illustrate. The Treasurer says:

Thus, as to a permanent deficiency in 1840, the Secretary says:

"The efficient means in that year will then amount, in the aggregate, to \$20,156,385

If Congress should make appropriations to the extent desired by the different Departments, the expenditures for 1840, independent of the redemption of Treasury notes, are estimated at 20,000,000

Including all the Treasury notes to be redeemed, the aggregate expenditure would be about 22,750,000

This would leave a deficit in the Treasury, at the close of the year, amounting to 2,593,315

He then adds, that certain debts are due from the State banks and the United States Bank, which, if paid duly, will prevent a deficit; but that it is not prudent to rely exclusively on the payment of those debts, and hence that other modes of obviating or meeting it are proper. Thus he states:

But there will be due from the United States Bank, in September next, on its fourth bond, about \$2,526,576

The principal now due on the Treasurer's deposits in other banks, which suspended specie payments in 1837, is 1,149,904

Should all these claims be collected in 1840, they would prevent a deficiency, and leave an available balance in the Treasury of nearly \$1,082,665

It is not, however, considered prudent to rely exclusively on the collection of these debts.

One mode, then, of obviating any difficulty from that circumstance, will be to reduce the aggregate of law appropriations, by postponing some, and lessening others, so that the means probably available will be sufficient to meet all calls upon the Treasury, and leave in it an average balance of about two millions."

He then adds, afterwards:

"But, when acting on these or other cases, if Congress cannot, consistently with its views of duty to the country, adopt the course suggested, and restrict the amount of appropriations, whether ordinary or extraordinary, to the certain current revenue, the only remaining courses which seem defensible are these; either to provide for recalling portions of the public money now deposited with States, or establish an adequate system of direct taxation, or at once resort to the contingent power contemplated in the existing laws concerning the tariff, when changes become necessary for purposes of revenue, and restore the duty on several articles of luxury now free."

Thus the Secretary urges action on it in the first half of the year, and assigns his reasons for it:

"All these, and similar considerations in favor of some permanent provision on this subject, apply with still greater force than they have heretofore. The available balance in the Treasury, to facilitate its operations, is much smaller than has formerly been usual. The receipts on the debts still due from banks, after two previous disappointments as to some of them, must be regarded with increased doubt; and if they should be paid within the coming year, the outstanding Treasury notes become redeemable in the first half of it, and must be discharged some months before the bond of the Bank of the United States falls due in September."

In conclusion, he adds:

"The Department, therefore, is now without any resort, temporary or permanent, in case of material deficiencies, and considering all the circumstances before mentioned, with the dangerous liability in law to have the whole outstanding Treasury notes paid in at any moment for public dues, without a power remaining to issue others in their stead; considering also the present revulsion in the commercial world, which affects so seriously the receipts from both duties and lands; considering the disasters which are befalling the banks, and rendering our collected funds in some cases wholly unavailable, and the advances necessary to be soon made for the large payment of pensions, and Treasury notes falling due in March, the earliest attention to new legislation on this subject seems highly prudent, if not indispensable, for the effectual security of the public credit."

But, sir, notwithstanding this plain, honest, and unsophisticated statement of the finances of the Government and the necessity of this measure, which is a part of the Secretary's report, and plainly hinted at in the President's message, the President and the Secretary have been charged, in the face of these facts, with attempting to gull and deceive the people by withholding, in the message and report, the real state of the finances. What is there too reckless for these modern Whigs to do? Sir, I have presented the expose of the Secretary of the Treasury. It is sufficient for my purpose to show the necessity of the issue of the amount of Treasury notes for which it provides. An intelligent community will appreciate the importance and necessity of the measure. It has been objected to on constitutional grounds. This objection I will leave to those who assume to themselves the peculiar and exclusive guardianship of the Constitution—to those whose political monomania is so well understood, that the Constitution has as little to fear from them as the community has to fear from the prophetic predictions of the lunatic pinning in the last stages of refined metaphysical abstraction.

This bill has been in Committee of the Whole House for nearly two weeks. The chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, at its introduction, made a short explanatory speech. Another of the committee [Mr. VANDERFEL] made a short speech of the same character. These are all the Democratic speeches that have been made in its behalf. The balance of the whole time has been consumed by the Whigs.

In the discussion, every measure of the Administration has been seized on and made the subject of unmeasured abuse; to all of which I will not now attempt to respond. I will wait for the action of the House upon another measure shortly to be before it, (I mean the Independent Treasury;) and I will now confine my remarks to the subject of the Florida war.

In the remarks which I am about to make, I may use language which may be considered unbecoming this place; if so, it must be charged to the unlimited abuse and reckless denunciations which we hear every day and every hour from the Opposition, and which we, the Administration, and the whole Democratic party, are the subjects of; and this is all the apology I have to make.

But to the Florida war.

Mr. Chairman, I take it for granted that an attempt will be made to convert every measure of the Administration, now before the country, of a general character, as well as those of a special nature, more immediately connected with the Admini-

stration of the Government, into political capital. This, the Opposition have a political right to do. I suppose if I were a Federalist, and as hard run as they are, I would do so too. At a time when the financial circumstances of Sparta were greatly embarrassed, a person offered Callicratidas (her principal commander) 50,000 crowns, under such circumstances as Callicratidas thought dishonorable to Sparta, and he refused to accept it; upon which Cleander, one of his officers, said, "I would accept the offer if I were in your place;" and so would I if I were in yours," said Callicratidas. I suppose if I possessed the same principles that govern them, I would take the same means which they do to carry them out. If the Federalists have a political right to thwart the Administration in all its measures, right or wrong, and to use all means, fair and foul, to bring it into disrepute with the people at home, and dishonor and disgrace abroad, such a right is not exercised in patriotism, nor is it founded in honor or justice; and while they are exercising, in base and unmanly abuse, a privilege which finds a political right in the free institutions of our country, rather than in the pure principles of justice or manly and honorable resistance, I hold the friends of this Administration will find an apology with the people who support it, in using a part of *their* time and means in repelling the charges which constitute the political capital of the Opposition. Among the many measures furnishing charges (as is pretended) of corruption and profligacy against the Administration, none seems to be more fruitful than the Florida war. Every Whig in the country, however unacquainted he may be with the Florida war, its causes, its progress, the difficulties attending its management, or the means the Administration have or have not had to terminate it, takes the cue from this Capitol, and yelps extravagance, disgrace, imbecility, and profligacy. Yes, sir, the veriest cockcomb that ever strutted in huckram, or represented the brainless dandy, who never heard a musket shot, or saw an Indian, can chatter the failures of the Florida war, and pronounce sentence upon the Administration and the War Department, with all the pertness of a well taught parrot; and from this Capitol proceeds their lesson.

Well, sir, while the Opposition are denouncing the Administration in broad and unqualified terms, without defining causes, or giving reasons for the procrastination of the war, for the benefit of those who may read me, I will ask your attention a short time, while I briefly trace some of the difficulties which the Administration have had to encounter in Florida.

Florida is situated between the 25th and 31st degrees of north latitude. It is bounded on the south and west in its whole extent by the Gulf of Mexico, and on the east by the Atlantic ocean, in its whole extent on that side. It is near four hundred miles in length, and its average breadth is near one hundred and fifty miles. It presents a surface nearly level, made up of everglades, lakes, swamps, barren pine lands, and hammocks, with some good and well situated land; of each of these varieties nearly an equal quantity. The swamps are almost impassable, and the hammocks

almost impenetrable to any human being, except an Indian.

Within the half century of the time when all Europe was waked up by the discovery of the New World, and when men dreamed of nothing but carving out provinces by the sword, of dividing the spoils of empires, plundering temples of their riches, riding upon the billows with loads of enslaved captives, and despoiling nations of their wealth and Governments, or "to plunder the accumulated treasures of some ancient Indian dynasty." I say it was about this time, or in 1512, that Juan Ponce de Leon, an adventurer of Spain, discovered Florida, and, in the name of Ferdinand, made Spain its owner. Ponce, as a reward for his discovery, was made its Governor, on condition that he would colonize it. Some time after this dignity was conferred upon him, he repaired, with two ship loads, to take possession of his new province, and select a site for a colony. He had not more than landed, when his crew were attacked by the Florida Indians, many of his men killed, and himself mortally wounded. He and the remainder of his men hastened to the ships, and sailed to Cuba, where he died of his wounds.

The next attempt to colonize Florida was made in 1528, by Pamphelo de Navarez. He entered Florida with three hundred men, some of whom were mounted. He was attacked by the Indians, and but five escaped, all the rest of whom fell a sacrifice to the Indians, pestilence, or famine. The love of discovery, plunder, and wealth, still raged, nor did all these disasters prevent another attempt to seek fortunes in Florida. Ferdinand de Soto, an ambitious courtier, embarked with seven or eight hundred troops (some of whom were mounted) and emigrants. No sooner were they landed than the Indians made them a sacrifice to their cunning, by leading them through swamps, everglades, and hammocks, scarcely passable or penetrable, in search of gold, until they were sunk with fatigue, and lost in the wilderness; but, stimulated with prospects, they were led still further, until they were beyond the province, and yet no gold; but the Peruvian prospects led them high in the regions of the Red river, but famine and pestilence compelled them to retrace their march to the Mississippi, where, when they arrived, scarce one third of their number were alive, and, with some frail and temporary boats of hasty construction, they reached the Gulf of Mexico, where they were accidentally picked up, and taken to Cuba.

Another attempt was made, with more religious solemnity, to settle Florida, in 1547. Through the influence of Philip, then heir apparent to the crown of Spain, Louis Caneello, a missionary of the Dominican order, gained permission to visit Florida, and attempt the peaceful and Christian conversion of the natives. All the Governors of the Spanish colonies were directed to favor the undertaking. All means that were calculated to advance the measure were advised. The slaves that had been taken north of the Gulf of Mexico were manumitted and restored to their country. A ship was fitted out, and the holy crew dismissed with more than usual solemnity; but Louis had no sooner landed, than he and a fellow priest, with several of his crew, were slaughtered. Florida was aban-

doned. It seemed as if Death made the avenues of Florida his abode, and guarded its shores. While Victory perched upon the Castilian standard every where else, the sands of Florida were perpetually wet with Spanish blood.

The French turned *their* attention to Florida, and planted a colony, by a commission from Charles IX. The squadron which bore them was commanded by John Rebault, a brave man, of maritime experience. They were landed, but remained but a short time, and, in their retreat, came near famishing on the ocean. After the treacherous peace between Charles IX. and the Huguenots, Coligny pushed his solicitations for the colonization of Florida. The king gave his consent; three ships were conceded for the service, and Laudonniery, who had been on a former voyage on the American coast, was appointed to lead forth the colony. Sixty days of favorable wind landed them on the shores of Florida. The benefits of the new colony of Huguenots was enjoyed but a short time, when the jealousy of Spain was aroused. Melendez was appointed and commissioned by Philip II, king of Spain, to invade Florida, and dispossess the Huguenots—and himself made Governor of the territory. He was accordingly fitted out with the requisite force, munitions and supplies. A tempestuous voyage landed him, with most of his forces, at the harbor of St. Augustine. Soon the Huguenots were attacked and massacred in a manner of which I shall not now shock humanity with a description, but which, for barbarity and cold blooded inhumanity, has not its parallel in the annals of savage or civilized warfare, except in the heart-sickening scenes of blood and indiscriminate slaughter which have marked the Florida war. This last invasion secured Spain in the possession of Florida, and her blood-stained troops, who intermarried with the natives, became her occupants. Their blood now flows in the veins of those with whom we were battling. The French court paid but little attention to that brutal and inhuman slaughter of the Huguenots. But the French nation and the Huguenots of France did not share in the apathy of the court. Dominic de Gourgues, a bold soldier of Gascony, by his own means and some contributions of his friends, fitted out three vessels, and with a force of one hundred and fifty, sailed for Florida. He did not expect with this force to occupy the country permanently; his object was revenge. He surprised two forts and took a number of prisoners, but finding himself unable to maintain his position, he hung his prisoners upon the trees and placed over them the inscription: "I do not this as unto Spaniards and mariners, but as unto traitors, robbers and murderers;" and hastily sailed for Europe. Some short time before the commencement of the Revolutionary war, an Englishman by the name of Turnbull brought a vessel loaded with Greeks to Florida, under a promise that they should be provided with a home, but who, as soon as landed, were reduced to slavery, and consigned to the sugar farms. A part of them made their escape into the interior, and found a safe retreat among the Indians, with whom they intermarried. A part of them were restored to liberty by the interference of Pilican, whose name

a creek now on the Atlantic side of Florida bears. Florida has long been the retreat and asylum of negro slaves; they have long found protection by the Indians, with whom they intermarry, and their offspring now make a part of the savages of that Territory.

Spain, it is well known, was largely indebted to the United States for spoiliations committed upon American commerce. Our claims were liquidated by a cession of Florida, by what is known to be the Spanish treaty, signed and confirmed July 10th, 1821, which is recognised substantially as follows:

"Whereas, by the treaty concluded between the United States and Spain on the 22d day of February, 1819, and duly ratified, the provinces of the Floridas were ceded by Spain to the United States, and the possession of the said provinces is now in the United States."

By this treaty, I say, Florida became a Territory of the United States; and by the provisions of the treaty the Federal Government was, and is, the exclusive owner of the soil, and holds the same in fee simple, except such portions as were owned and occupied by citizens, pursuing civilized cultivation; and they, by that treaty, became citizens of the United States, and were bound and protected by their laws. The kingdom of Spain had a right to occupy Florida by the laws of nations; and, having the right to occupy, had the right to convey, and did convey. The United States, by the laws of nations, had the right to purchase, and did purchase. The conveyance was full and unconditional, as appears by the whole treaty, and every part thereof; in consequence of which the United States forthwith extended her jurisdiction over the whole territory. But it is said and asserted by the Indians that the Spanish agent assured them, through their chiefs, that it was not the intention of the Spanish Government to cede any portion of Florida to the United States, except what was then occupied by those pursuing the occupations of civilized life, nor one acre "on this side" of the furrow of the plough share. Such an exception may have been made with the Indians; if so, it was a fraud practised on them by the Spaniards, or their agent; but, as they were no party to the contract, and the United States having had no part in the promised reservation, consequently their right to the exclusive jurisdiction to the whole territory and their freehold in the soil is absolute.

But the right of the United States to the freehold of Florida does not depend upon the cession of Spain, the right of occupancy by conquest, nor the arbitrary laws of nations. The Federal Government purchased from the Florida Indians, in 1823, upwards of three millions of acres, for which the sum of one hundred and six thousand dollars was paid; and in 1834, four million thirty-two thousand six hundred and forty acres, for which the sum of two hundred and ninety-five thousand five hundred dollars was paid.

The possession of the United States to the territory, and jurisdiction over it, seemed to be undisputed until 1835, when the supposed claims of the Indians were asserted by some of those barbarous outrages and cold-blooded murders which have signalized the Florida war from its beginning to this time.

Now, sir, I am prepared to respond to some of

the charges made against the Administration, and particularly against the War Department, for the manner in which this war has been conducted, its prostration, the millions it has cost the Government, and the alleged imbecility of some of the officers who have had charge of it. I have before stated, and I now say, that all these charges are made for political effect—made to blast the reputation of the Administration, to sink the cause of Democracy, and advance the Federal cause; and in character and concert with the never-ceasing torrent of slander and reckless abuse which has been poured upon every Democratic Administration, from the days of Jefferson to this time, and will be continued, while the Democracy sways the Government. I mean what I say, and I say what I mean. I will now ask your attention, while I present the history and practical operations of the Florida war; the nature of the country, which is its theatre; the character of the enemy with whom we are contending, and the embarrassments under which the Executive and the War Department have had to labor.

I have stated that the Florida war broke out late in 1835. It will be remembered, at that time we were threatened with a war with France. The time had arrived when our claims upon France for spoiliations could no longer be deferred, without subjecting ourselves to the charge of national degradation and submissive cowardice. General Jackson, who then administered the Government, was compelled, in his message on that subject, to recommend reprisals on French vessels and French property, as the only means of redress left. This was a virtual declaration of war; a reciprocal declaration of war on the part of France, or a liquidation of our claims, was the only alternative left her. To her national honor, and the cause of justice, she chose and fulfilled the latter; but while she was contemplating the course she should take, war hung over our heads, and at the same time the Indian war was raging in Florida. The Administration was denounced from Maine to Florida by every corrupt Federal sheet and every Federal strut in the land, for not subduing the enemy in Florida, and for not defending the poor Floridians from the merciless tomahawk and the torch of the Indian—when it was well known by every intelligent man in the Union, and acknowledged by every honest one, that the safety and the interest of the nation demanded that the whole force of the American troops should be kept on the seaboard so long as the French war threatened us. What was the trying situation of the Administration then, sir? While every Federal demagogue and every bank pensioned sheet was denouncing it for not sending troops to Florida, the safety and dignity of the nation forbade it. The candid, though honest, acknowledgment of its inability to do so, was prevented by a laudable and necessary national pride; and the Administration was prohibited the exercise of a just and what would have been a triumphant defence against the vile calumnies of the times; for, had the Administration, or its supporters, acknowledged its inability to withdraw troops from the seaboard to defend our frontier from the barbarity of the In-

dians, it would have been a virtual acknowledgment of our inability to contend with France in the war in which we were about to embark, and which we ourselves had virtually declared; and France would not have failed to have taken advantage of our acknowledged weakness. Sir, I say if such an acknowledgment had been made by the Administration, our claims on France would be now unliquidated, and we would, at this day, in all probability, be in the midst of a war with her. But an acknowledgment, which was due in justice to the Administration.

Our Government is one of limited powers. The Executive of our Government is an officer, bound by limitations. He is not a Russian autocrat, with a standing army of six hundred thousand regular troops, and with power to order as many more, and with power to raise the means to maintain them. No, sir, our Constitution provides "that the President be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States." The power to declare war, raise armies, and to maintain them, belongs to Congress, and not to the President. So far as legislation is concerned, the President is but a co-ordinate branch of Congress, and his positive powers are confined to the signing of bills which may pass the Senate and House of Representatives—his negative powers consist in withholding his signature, and that power avails him nothing should a bill pass both popular branches of Congress by a vote of two-thirds of each branch. This is the amount of power the President has in raising and maintaining armies. What was the Administration to do at the time I am speaking? Threatened with war by France; actually involved in war in Florida, and the untold tomahawk performing, in savage barbarity, the work of death; beset with slander and falsehood by every unprincipled, corrupt newspaper sheet, and every unprincipled Federal coxcomb demagogue in the land; without the power to preserve the country, or resist the enemy; and without the power (in prudent exercise) of justifying itself against the base slanders heaped upon it, by declaring its want of ability; what, I ask, was the Executive to do? Why, there was but one duty for him to perform; but one power for him to exercise; and that duty and that power was prescribed by the Constitution, as follows:

He (the President) shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.

This duty and this power was exercised. The Executive, through the Secretary of War, early in 1835 made a communication to the Senate, in which he set forth the embarrassments of the country, with reference to our foreign dangers, and the war in Florida, and in which he urged upon Congress the importance and indispensable necessity of augmenting the army. This message was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, of which the honorable R. M. Johnson was chairman. The necessity of the measure was properly appreciated by the committee and the Senate, and a bill to increase the army was reported, and passed by the Senate. It went to the House, but did not receive

its action. The same measure was urged upon Congress by the Executive at its next session; it was again referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and a bill to augment the army reported; and passed by the Senate, but failed in the House. Thus was the Executive thwarted in obtaining the means by which the Florida war would, in all probability, have been instantly suppressed, and much innocent blood, and many millions of money been saved; and yet the reckless and demagogical cry of imbecility and extravagance is raised by one universal Federal yelp against the Administration, for that which Congress failed to put in its power to do.

I now proceed to expose the policy pursued in relation to the Florida war, which will account for the useless expenditure of millions, the procrastination of the war, and the heart-sickening shed of blood, human slaughter, and destruction of property, and a policy, too at war, with every effort of the Executive and the War Department of this Government; an exposition which, I think, the intelligent reader will understand and appreciate, and will know where, and on whom, to lay the blame of all our failures and misfortunes in the Florida war.

As soon as our difficulties with France were settled, the United States troops were ordered to Florida, or so many of them as were not necessary to remain with our fortifications. But the number was insufficient. Congress had failed to augment the regular army. No other course was left for the Executive but to make drafts upon the militia for volunteers. This was done at a most frightful expense, and frequently resulted in little more than *marching and countermarching*—that is, marching to Florida and marching back again, such was the limited time for which they volunteered, and such the distance they had to march.

I will enumerate some of those marches.

In January, 1836, when the news of Dade's massacre reached New Orleans, General Gaines raised a corps of volunteers, and, united with a few regulars, marched them from Louisiana to Florida, where they served until the ensuing May, when they were marched back to their homes, and discharged.

In the month of February of that year, two armies of volunteers and militia, between three and four thousand strong, were raised by General Scott, one in South Carolina and Georgia, the other in Alabama, and marched to Florida, where they served about *sixty days*, and were then marched back and discharged.

In the month of June following, a brigade of mounted volunteers was organized in Tennessee, and put in march for Florida. It halted a while in the Creek country, and entered Florida late in September, where it served until December, when its term of service expired, and it then took up the line of march on its return to Tennessee, in the midst of the campaign then in progress.

The departure of the Tennessee volunteers for home at a critical period of the campaign, imposed upon the commanding General the necessity of calling upon Georgia and Alabama for another contribution; and accordingly, a corps of volunteers was again organized in each of those States, and

marched from thence into Florida, where they served about *three months*, when they likewise commenced their return march to their homes.

In the fall of 1837, the Executive made a very energetic effort to close the war during the then approaching winter; and a large force of volunteers was drawn from Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi, in the hope of effecting that object. They arrived in December, and served through the winter, when they were marched back to their remote homes, and discharged.

From this brief review, it is seen that as many as five volunteer armies, from first to last, have been raised, organized, and marched from distant parts to Florida, to serve two or three months, and then marched back to their homes. I have no means of knowing the precise number thus mustered into service, and then mustered out again, but from what information I have been able to gather, the whole number was not less than twenty thousand, exclusive of the Florida militia who were in the country.

New, sir, when we consider that the expenses of militia and volunteers commence under the law, (see act of 20th April, 1818,) the moment they leave their homes, even while marching to the rendezvous, and continue until they are marched back again to the same place, I ask, can there be any wonder with the honest and reflecting mind, that such operations as I have described should have been expensive, more especially when it is considered that scarcely any but mounted volunteers can be obtained, and these, including their horses and forage, cost, I am informed, near six times as much as regular foot soldiers.

The commanding general is responsible for the expenses incurred by the operations of the army, after it is placed in the field under his command. The Executive is responsible for the judicious application of the means placed at his disposal by Congress to carry on war. But Congress is clearly responsible for the inadequacy or unfitness of those means, and for all the consequences resulting therefrom, especially if the recommendations of the Executive have been disregarded or overruled, as they have been throughout the Florida war.

If, then, it be true, as I think it is, and as every man will think who will examine the subject, that the heavy expenses of the Florida war have resulted chiefly from the employment of volunteers and militia, instead of regular troops, the responsibility for those expenses clearly attaches to Congress, rather than to the Executive, or to the subordinate officers acting under the Executive authority.

The army was increased in July, 1833, since which, there have been but few volunteers or militia employed, and none drawn from a distance. The consequences have been, that the expenses of the war have been greatly reduced, as an examination will show. The expenses of the last campaign have been any thing but extravagant, the force being nearly all regulars.

Sir, I feel myself bound here to speak of the services of Colonel T. Cross, who has had charge of the quartermaster department in Florida during the last campaign. That officer has distinguished

himself in that capacity as he has in every other official station which he has held under the Government. It is due to him to say that he has been the practical agent, by which the system of reform, regularity and retrenchment, has been adopted in the conduct of the army in Florida, by which not less than from two to three hundred thousand dollars have been saved to the Government within the last year. I submit his circular, which I ask may be read, and I regret that its length will preclude its admission in my printed remarks. The plan contained in this circular, was the plan of the Executive and of the War Department, but he was the active agent who produced its practical results, that have and will save to the Government hundreds of thousands of dollars. I hope this circular may find its way in the columns of every honest newspaper in the country. I think it would have the effect to stop the mouth of many a barking Whig whiffet. It will be seen by this circular, as well as by its results, that every means have been adopted that could be adopted without impairing the efficiency of the service, to retrench expenditures and secure economy: Sir, it is almost incredible to those unacquainted with the almost entire destitution of resources in Florida, the expenses that the Government has had to incur in the conduct of the war. At the commencement of the war, and for some time thereafter, the Government was compelled to pay for the hire of a steamboat, per day, from three to four hundred dollars—and, I believe, in many instances, defray the expenses of the boat—and, I think, in some instances, had to pay as high as forty-five dollars a cord for wood. Steamboats were not used for any other purpose than the transportation of troops and munitions of war, and never for that purpose when it could be avoided; still, such were the pressing necessities for a speedy transportation of troops, that such expenses had to be incurred, and such means of conveyance adopted. Provisions, forage, and labor of every description, bore an almost corresponding price. But these, sir, are only some of the difficulties and embarrassments with which the Government have had to contend. I have more and greater to speak of, but I must first respond to some of the more special charges made upon the Administration, both in this and the other branch of this Capitol. Emphatic complaints are made of the want of energy in the War Department; and it is now urged upon Congress to adopt some decisive action to bring this war to a close, and that some more efficient means than that adopted by the Executive should have been adopted by the last Congress. Sir, I will agree that Congress, long before this, should have adopted "some more efficient means." Congress should have, in compliance with the recommendation of the President in 1836, increased the number of the regular army; but it was enough that it was a measure of the Administration to enlist the whole Opposition against it. But, sir, Congress did do something "efficient," and so efficient as to thwart the whole operations of the War Department; for it is well known that the most active and efficient measures had been adopted and were in operation by the War Department, and were in progress of execution in Florida when they were arrested by the ac-

tion of Congress * If Congress had not interfered and directed that renewed efforts to pacify that country, and to reconcile the Seminoles, should be made, the military operations would have been prosecuted with vigor, and in all probability the murders and depredations which were the fruits of that injudicious attempt at negotiation, would have been avoided, so that the bloodshed and treachery which is so often charged upon the War Department, were the work, not of that Department, but the work of Congress, or were occasioned by the fact that the attention of those who make these charges were unfortunately "directed" to the war in Florida. Sir, to the constancy of the Opposition, that this war has continued so long, and that it will still continue, unless Congress give it their attention, I would say it will still continue, unless Congress cease to give it their attention, and cease to interfere with the military operations by efforts to make peace, which will ever prove abortive. A member of the Senate [Mr. PRESTON] says: "It was thought that the few straggling warriors would yield at once to the mere demonstration of force by the General Government. Under this delusion the late Administration terminated, and the present Administration came in." That was not so: when the late Administration came in, the commanding general believed the war to be over, and so informed the War Department. The commanding general had good reason to believe so, and was justifiable in so reporting, as I will show before I am done. But he was soon undeceived by one of those signal acts of treachery which have distinguished the conduct of the Indians in Florida throughout the whole progress of this war. Upon the receipt of this news, preparations upon an extensive scale were immediately made to renew the contest, with greater means and energy than had been before adopted, or ever exhibited in the warfare of this country. In short, nothing within the power and means of the Executive, or the power of the War Department, was left undone. And it is said "that the dilatory progress of the war, not to say the disgrace of it, was chiefly owing to the impotency of the head of the War Department." Sir, such a charge can only proceed from a shameful disregard of truth, or an unpardonable ignorance of the facts and history of the Florida war on the part of him who makes it; and nothing but the obligations of order and decorum that govern the conduct of one branch of this Legislature towards the other, prevents me from alluding, by name, to the individual who made it †.

Now, Sir, what are the facts? The officers who conducted the operations in Florida during the first and second campaigns, called, some for fifteen hundred, others for three thousand, men, as a force that would be required to finish the

war; and General Scott thought it would require five thousand men, and he made his short campaign with that number; but when the War Department became aware that hostilities were to be renewed, the "impotent" head of that Department [Mr. Poinsett] thought it advisable to augment that force to ten thousand men. He never labored under the delusion "that the straggling warriors of Florida were to be subdued by a mere demonstration of force." He knew their strength, and was aware of the difficulties presented by the peculiar nature of the country, and of the climate. He at once determined to increase the forces to be employed in Florida above all former estimates. Ten thousand men were sent into Florida and afterwards distributed by placing two thousand in posts, and eight thousand were employed in scouring the country; and no army in the world was ever better supplied and subsisted.

These were the the peculiar duties of "the head of the War Department," and they were most effectually performed on his part. It is said that the late President [General Jackson] would have dragged, as with a net, the Territory of Florida, if he had been been aware of the real state of affairs. General Jackson and all his measures, while he was in office, were as bitterly and as rocklessly assailed, by the present Opposition, as Mr. Van Buren and his measures now are; and the compliment is only bestowed upon General Jackson for base and selfish party purposes, that Mr. Van Buren may be disgraced. The force which Mr. Poinsett put into Florida was not sufficient to drag a territory of more than forty-five thousand square miles, "as with a net;" but it proved sufficient to kill, capture, and send out of the country, more than three thousand of the enemy, and nearly all the negroes, who were the most active and formidable of their warriors.

The force sent to Florida that year by the Secretary of War, consisted of regulars, Indian warriors from the Northwest, hunters and guides, and the bravest of the brave from Missouri, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, mounted men, the courage, activity, and chivalry of the country. They did their duty, and beat the enemy whenever they met them; and by the battle of Okechobee, totally changed the character of the contest. Since that action, the Indians have never made fight in masses. They were beaten and dispersed, and never again assembled in sufficient numbers to attack our troops. They continued, however, their murderous assaults upon our defenceless settlements; and, broken up into small parties, prowled over the country like beasts of prey, killing women and children, and destroying, by fire, houses and barns—marking their progress with devastation and desolation. In this stage of the contest, and in this state of the opposing forces, it is demanded by gentlemen here, in "powdered wigs," perfumed cologne, and white gloves, in the warm and secure halls of this Capitol, with the comfortable per diem of eight dollars, that "the war should be prosecuted effectually, and prosecuted at once;" and gentlemen here, who would, like Cleon, flee at the approach of the tomahawk, promise plans by which the Florida war may at "once be terminated." Well, sir, while gentlemen who are better qualified to stand by the

* When General Taylor was actively and successfully engaged in scouring the country, and driving the Indians from the swamps and hammocks where they had concealed themselves, defeating, killing, and taking them prisoners, or dispersing them, wherever he found them, Congress arrested his operations by providing that *peaceable measures* should be adopted by the War Department, and Gen. Macomb was directed to proceed to Florida to carry into effect the direction of Congress; all of which resulted in a complete failure.

† It is presumed Mr. DUNCAN here alludes to Mr. PRESTON, of the Senate.

toilet, or whirl the belle in the giddy waltz, than to stand by their country in danger, or perform the duties of a soldier in the swamps and hammocks of Florida, are preparing their *plan*, by which "an end may at once be put to the war." We will examine what has been done, and the probable reasons which induced the Secretary of War to change the manner of conducting the war, if war it can now be called.

From the opinion I entertain of the Secretary of War, and, I presume, the opinion generally entertained of him, from the distinguished manner in which he has discharged every official duty imposed upon him, if he supposed the war could be speedily terminated by bringing the whole force of the United States, he would have adopted that course, (did he control the means.) But he appears, on the contrary, to be convinced that to multiply the militia forces in that country, and to attempt to "*drag it as with a net*," would only result in exhausting the Treasury, (a much wished for event by some gentlemen here,) and entailing upon the Government interminable claims for losses and pensions. But it is said, "we owe it to humanity and civilization to close this war at once." None are more sensible of that than are the Executive and the head of the War Department; but they do not believe it is to be accomplished by covering the country with troops, unless every square mile were occupied, which would require over forty-five thousand troops. The Secretary of War believes it to be a work of time, and that it is to be wrought out by regulars, aided by a small militia force, and by a body of men trained as regulars and hunters. Every effort of the Executive and the head of the War Department has been marked with well directed judgment; and all the success that could be expected has been accomplished, from the means with which they had to act, the character of the enemy with which they have had to contend, and the face of the country which is the theatre of war. The Secretary of War, it will be seen, ordered General Taylor to direct all his efforts to protect the settlements in Middle Florida, and effectually clear the Indians out of that portion of the Territory, before he proceeded to scour the country south. General Taylor performed that duty; but it is thought he proceeded south too soon, and, on his march south, the Indians rose up, or passed into his rear, and committed murders and depredations there. He then returned, districted the country, and planted posts in each district, and was successfully prosecuting his operations, when Congress arrested them, as I have before described. The interference of Congress produced treachery and bloodshed, and paralyzed the movements of the army. After the interference of Congress proved abortive, that gallant army resumed, and is now engaged in hunting up the murderers, and driving them across the Suwannee, that the inhabitants of Middle Florida may cultivate their fields in peace. The country will then again be districted, posts again be established, and if the plan of the Secretary of War be adopted by Congress, one thousand men, armed, equipped, and drilled, for the express service, will be employed in scouring the swamps between the posts, and securing the settlers from invasion. In this

manner, it is believed, the contest with these savages may be brought to a close. If unnecessary millions have been spent in this war, it has been done by attempting to carry out plans of Congress, both by its interference with the War Department, and by its failure to augment the regular army on the recommendation of the Executive, at a time when the Indians were strong in their own belief, when they were concentrated in large bodies, and when one or two battles, with an efficient force, would have decided the contest. But the policy of Congress has been otherwise, and the result as the Executive and the head of the War Department anticipated. There is no good reason why vast and expensive armies, to subdue what can now only be called an insurrection, should be raised, to subdue and conquer a few wild wandering savages, whom a single regiment could cut entirely off, in an open field fight, but whom to destroy at once, with their advantages of swamps, hammocks, everglades, and secret passes, in which they conceal themselves by day, but are almost inaccessible and impenetrable to civilized man, would require a force equal in number to every square mile of territory. The Secretary of War has discovered the errors in the plans suggested of bringing this contest to a close, and has wisely concluded that it can be better and more securely effected by the means he is now employing than by any other.

Mr. Chairman, I am aware in the coming political campaign, that every means will be used by the Opposition to turn what they please to call the failure of the Administration to terminate the Florida war, to overthrow the powers that be; misrepresentation and falsehood will be bandied by every Federal Whig, tapeseller, coxcomb, and puff-bagger in the land; and every Bank pensioned sheet will teem with slander and abuse about the failure to put down the Indians in Florida. This must be expected. It is perfectly in character with the Federal party. It is the kind of game they have been playing ever since the commencement of the Government, to the end that Democracy may be prostrated, and its supporters put down, and Federalism established, and its advocates and supporters put into office. In this the Federalists of this country are not singular. It is the way with every faction in every country which has a Republican Government. Nor does the object of the Federal party here, differ from the enemies of human liberty elsewhere; the same motives govern them all over the world, and at all times. There is no course that the Administration could have taken, that would have saved it from the censure of a faction determined to be satisfied with nothing short of the downfall of the Democratic party, and the prostration of the Democratic institutions of our country. If the Administration had been successful in cutting off every Seminole murderer in Florida, and exterminating that barbarous race, whose whole course and conduct in this conflict have been marked in blood and indiscriminate slaughter, why, the Federal party would have instantly turned into a humane and "peace" party, as was the case in the last war with Great Britain, and the vengeance of God would have been invoked to avenge the blood that this Administration

had brought upon this nation. If the Administration had been so successful as to have taken every Seminole Indian by capture, without shedding the blood of one, and transplanting them in the far West, why, sir, this land would now be filled with Federal tears and Federal mourning, at the sacrilegious crime of tearing the poor Indians from their native homes and their father's graves, as was the case when the Georgia Indians were moved west of the Mississippi, and many a fervent prayer would have ascended from the sacred altar to revenge the injuries and violence done the poor Seminoles. But as it is, there will not be a Federal parrot but will take its cue from the party orators here, and will be heard to prattle, "*the Florida war was begun in extravagance, conducted in weakness, and must end in disgrace.*" But, sir, the Executive and the head of the War Department are not the only officers whose reputations are to be blighted by the sirocco breath of foul faction and polluted Federalism. The distinguished and gallant Jesup must be its victim also. Sir, if we could see some of the popinjay Federal dandies, who undertake to prescribe the "*plans*" by which the Florida war is to be terminated, enter the swamps of Florida, and face a group of Seminoles, I think it would be a Cleon affair. At a time when the Athenians were hard pressed by the enemy at home, with whom they were then engaged, in addition to difficulties from abroad, the domestic tranquillity of Greece was disturbed by the ambition of Cleon and Bracides, who were both advocates of war, and the former never failed to do whatever could be done to foment it. Cleon was desirous of war, because it served to screen his base immoralities and corrupt vices; Bracides, because it added new lustre to his reputation, as no general was more successful than he.

Cleon, like some of the demagogues of our day, was constantly in the habit of denouncing the officers of state and of the army as impotent and unfit for the duties of the stations they held. All the failures in battle were attributed by him to incapacity and mismanagement; charges thus made against the commanding officers, brought upon him the indignation and contempt of many reflecting and valuable citizens, while it raised him in the estimation of others less reflecting. This difference of opinion of the character and conduct of Cleon, produced two parties. The friends of Cleon presented him as a candidate for General, to take charge of the troops. His party proved the strongest, and he was elected. He gained some credit soon after by taking Sphacteria, more by accident than either conduct or courage, which raised him prodigiously in his own estimation, and made him insupportably haughty. He was now to command the troops which were to oppose Brasidas, the Lacedæmonian General, who commanded the city of Amphipolis. The time came when the city was to be attacked, and now the man was to be tried who had found the failure of every battle that the Athenians had lost, in the weakness or cowardice of her generals. Cleon marched his troops near the city wall. Bracides neither showed himself nor did he even permit one of his sentinels to be seen. Cleon retired,

exulting that Bracides was afraid to give him battle. The next day he marched his troops to the very gates of Amphipolis, when suddenly Bracides, with his troops, rushed upon the Athenian troops. Cleon took flight at the first approach of the enemy, and in his flight a soldier shot a dart into his back. He soon sunk and expired. Sir, I think if some of our modern Whig generals in buckram, were to go to Florida, we would hear of Cleons wounded in the back, if they should fail to have the heels of the Seminoles. But, sir, I will not ask my readers to take my word for the merits due to Gen. Jesup and others that I might name, for services in the Florida war. I have too much confidence in the intelligence and research of the American people to attempt naked assertions upon their credulity, without either reason, history, or facts. I know, sir, whole speeches are made up here of naked assertions and shameless exaggeration, and spread far and wide for political deception. Such a course may suit that class of politicians, one of whose fundamental principles is a denial of intelligence, stability, and virtue, to the mass of the people. Such efforts generally find their reward in the contempt of the public, whom it is intended to deceive.

I will, therefore, ask your attention while I specify some of the duties performed by some of the commanding officers who have had charge, from time to time, of the Florida war. This, I am aware, I shall do very imperfectly, for I am without the proper light upon the subject, there being no regular history of the Florida war. But while I know I shall fail to do justice to all, I will try to do injustice to none.

I have hinted at the cause of the Florida war. I have stated that it broke out some time at the close of 1835; or, this was about the time hostilities commenced.

General Clinch was ordered into service with a small force of two or three hundred regular troops, and four or five hundred volunteers. Major Dade marched from Tampa Bay to join General Clinch at Fort King with a small force, (something over one hundred and twenty men,) and was attacked by the Indians near the Wahoo swamp, defeated, and he and his men massacred near where there is now a fort called after that officer. In December, 1836 General Clinch marched from Fort Drane to attack the Indians with his regular forces and volunteers on the Withlacoochee river. At about thirty-five miles from his post, he met the Indians on crossing the river. The regular troops, and but 27 or 28 volunteers, had crossed the river with him. The time for which the volunteers had enlisted to serve had expired, and they refused, except the number I have stated. With this force he fought the Indians and drove them; but, not being sustained by the volunteers, he was forced to give back and recross the river, and he returned to Fort Drane.

At the time the news of Major Dade's massacre reached Mobile, where Major General Gaines then was, he with promptness repaired to New Orleans, where he, with creditable zeal, organized a force of regular and volunteer troops, amounting to about eleven hundred men, and proceeded, without delay, to Tampa Bay, where he arrived about the 10th of February, and, after making preparations

for the field, marched on the Fort King road to Dade's battle ground, where he buried the meritorious dead with the honors of war, from which he marched to Fort King. He drew a small supply of subsistence from Fort Drane; he also received a small supply of ammunition, and immediately marched to the Withlacoochee river, where he arrived on the 27th, and encountered, the same day, the enemy across the river in a conflict of half an hour, when the troops withdrew for the night, after a loss of one killed and six or seven wounded. The next morning the troops marched down the river two or three miles, where it was supposed it could be crossed. There the advance of the army was fired upon; an action ensued, which lasted until the middle of the day, in which Lieut. Izard was mortally wounded. The troops kept their ground, encamped that night, and threw up a breastwork, and an express was despatched to General Clinch, or the officer commanding at Fort Drane. The next morning the enemy, in number between ten and fifteen hundred men, appeared and made an attack on three sides of the camp, which was kept up for more than two hours, when he withdrew, leaving one of his number dead on the field. Another despatch was sent to Fort Drane. From this time until the 5th of March, the enemy made several spirited attacks upon the camp, in which several conflicts the loss on the part of General Gaines's troops were, six or seven killed, and thirty-five or forty wounded.

On the night of the 5th March a proposition was heard from the woods by the enemy, and the next morning several Indians appeared at a distance with a white flag. Adjutant Barrow of the volunteers was sent to confer with them. They informed him that they did not wish to fight any more, but they wanted General Gaines to go away; upon which information General Gaines sent out Captain Hitchcock, with two or three other officers, to confer further with them. The Indians repeated to him their desire for peace, and stated that a great many of their men had been killed. While this conference was going on, the advance of General Clinch's troops fired on the Indians who were in the rear, when they, and the chiefs who were in council, fled and concealed themselves in the hammocks, and were no more seen until near the middle of March. The command of General Gaines's troops was turned over by him to General Clinch, who fell back upon Fort Drane, as I have before stated. This is a brief sketch of the part which General Gaines took in this war, in all of which he and his troops sustained themselves in a manner creditable to the American arms; I mean so far as their time and means would permit.

In January, 1836, General Scott was ordered to Florida to take charge of the war. He was unlimited as to means.—[See Senate doc. 224, pages 91 and 199.] He arrived in Florida soon after his order. He organized his force, and we find him at Fort Drane about the 14th of March, 1836. General Scott ordered one division of his army, (his left wing,) by the way of the St. Johns, to meet him on the Withlacoochee river, while he moved from Fort Drane, on the 26th of March, with a force of 1,968 men, regulars and volunteers, with eighteen days' provisions, as appears in Senate

doc. page 97, and by his own statement. He arrived on the Withlacoochee on the morning of the 28th, and of course with subsistence for sixteen days, having been on the march but two days. He found the Indians embodied on the Withlacoochee; he attacked them and drove them into the swamp, but did not follow them more than four or five miles. It is believed no Indians were killed, nor were any prisoners taken. He then took up the line of march for Tampa Bay, where he arrived in eleven days from Fort Drane, and of course with seven days' subsistence. The left wing of his army, which had been sent to Volusia, on the St. Johns, moved from thence to Palaklehaha, where, according to General Scott's report, they found ponies and cattle in abundance, but were obliged to march to Tampa Bay for want of provisions. Where were the cattle which were in abundance? They arrived at Tampa Bay about the same time that General Scott, with his troops, arrived.

I wish it remembered that Gen. Scott was on the Withlacoochee, with sixteen days' provisions, where the enemy was embodied, with his right wing, consisting of nineteen hundred and sixty-eight troops, about the same time that the left wing of his army was at Palaklehaha, a distance of not more than thirty-five or forty miles from where Gen. Scott was on the Withlacoochee, and where the enemy was embodied. I wish it remembered, also, that there were abundance of cattle at Palaklehaha. Two days were sufficient to bring the whole force of the two wings of Gen. Scott's army, which would have amounted to near four thousand regulars and volunteers, to the spot where the almost entire Indians were embodied, and with subsistence (cattle) in abundance. These are facts which I wish remembered, as I will have to refer to them again. But, sir, we now find both wings of Gen. Scott's army at Tampa Bay, and with seven days' provisions, and not one Indian killed or taken prisoner, on the march that took them there. Gen. Scott sent a detachment from Tampa Bay, under Gen. Smith, to Charlotte Harbor, south of Tampa Bay; but he found no Indians there. From this, Gen. Smith returned with his troops to New Orleans, at the expiration of their terms. Gen. Scott returned to St. Augustine, with his left division, by the way of Volusia. His right division returned to Fort Drane on nearly the same route by which it marched out; where, and when, the volunteers were discharged, and sent home, as also were the volunteers of the left wing at St. Augustine. Soon after Gen. Scott arrived at St. Augustine, he had leave to quit Florida, or remain, as he chose. He was directed, in case he should leave Florida, to proceed to the Creek country, to take charge of that war. He left Florida in May, 1836.

Thus ended General Scott's campaign in Florida, without killing half a dozen of Indians, and without taking a single prisoner, and left the Indians scattered over the country as hostile and untamed as when he found them, and with more confidence in their own strength, although his army was strong, his troops of the bravest character, and he unlimited by the War Department in his acquisition in means, with the Treasury open to his service.

I have collected most of the facts I have here stated, from Senate document No. 224, which is the journal and the report of the court of inquiry held at the city of Frederick, in Maryland—a court established to inquire into the causes of the signal failure of General Scott to bring the Florida war to an end; and all the evidence furnishing these facts is *ex parte* in its character, and furnished by General Scott himself. At the proper time I shall take some further notice of this gentleman and his conduct in the Creek war. At present I will leave him.

When General Scott left Florida, Governor Call had orders from the War Department to take charge of the Florida War. He took charge of the war. His forces at that time consisted of some regular troops and some volunteers; but what number of each, or what was the whole, I am unable to say; but I think not a very strong force, owing to the sickness of the season. General Call spent the principal part of the sickly season in the defence of the frontiers. He killed some of the enemy, and took some prisoners. In November, 1836, it was understood that a part of the enemy were embodied in the Wahoo swamp, near the Witalacoochee. He marched from Fort Drake to that point, and arrived with five days' provisions. He attacked the enemy, had three successive battles, and defeated them in each—killed a number of them, and dispersed the remainder. His provisions being exhausted, and the enemy being dispersed, he marched to Volusia, where he turned over the command to General Jesup, who was ordered to receive it.

I will now leave Florida for a short time, to pay my addresses to General Scott, who is figuring in the Creek war, in Alabama, and on the western line of Georgia.

I have stated that General Scott had permission to leave Florida, and repair to Alabama, and take charge of the Creek war. The War Department had advice of his intention to leave Florida, but was also informed that his health was bad; and apprehensive that he might not be able to proceed to Alabama, or to take charge of the war, ordered General Jesup (who was then in Washington city) to proceed to Alabama and take charge of the Creek war, should General Scott's health not permit him; or, if otherwise, to act under him. In compliance with this order, General Jesup proceeded to Alabama, and on his way met General Scott at Augusta, in Georgia, on the 30th of May, 1836, from which they proceeded to Columbus. General Scott directed General Jesup to the western side of the Creek country, in Alabama, or to the head quarters of Governor Clay, to take charge of the war in that quarter. I think the Alabama troops were quartered at Tuskegee. General Jesup's first exertions were directed to assembling the Indians who had not yet engaged with the hostile party, but were on a poise as to the side they should join. In this effort General Jesup was successful. He gained Opotheolo, the principal and most able chief of the Creek nation, and secured other chiefs, and about sixteen or seventeen hundred warriors. He then gave notice of his intention to move into the Indian country on the 12th June, and on the evening before, which was on the 11th, the principal

hostile chief, Nekameco, came in with a hundred warriors, and surrendered. In compliance of General Scott's order to General Jesup was, after joining Governor Clay's head quarters, to move to Erwinton, south of the Creek country. From Tuskegee to Erwinton there were two roads; one that passed along the frontier of the white settlements, the other passed near the hostile camps. General Jesup took the latter, and arrived near the hostile camp on the night of the 17th, having on his way captured the chief who commanded it. The same night all the warriors of Opotheolo joined him. The next day he moved forward to the hostile camp with the volunteers, having previously sent the Indian warriors by a circuitous route on the other side of the camp, so as to prevent the flight or escape of the Indians. He then went forward, and entered the camp, but found it deserted; the Indians having fled a short distance at his approach. The Indian warriors made some prisoners, and prevented a general dispersion.

At this moment General Jesup received orders from General Scott to cease all hostile operations, and to march his troops, and encamp near Fort Mitchell, a distance of twenty-two or three miles.

General Jesup, unwilling to promptly disobey the orders of his superior officer, and more unwilling to permit the enemy to disperse, which he considered almost in his grasp, surrendered for the time his command to General Patterson, who commanded the division of Alabama volunteers, with orders to encamp the troops, and keep out strong detachments to prevent the enemy from escaping, and mounted his horse and repaired, with all possible speed, to Fort Mitchell, to report to General Scott the actual condition of the enemy, and to obtain his permission to go on and end the war, or to advise him (Scott) to take the command himself and finish it; but not finding General Scott at Fort Mitchell, he returned to the camp, determined to end the war. On his return to the army, he sent out some of the hostile chiefs, whom he had captured, to summon the hostiles to surrender. They did surrender; and, in place of sending to General Scott a notice of his compliance with his order to cease all hostile operations, &c. General Jesup sent him the following communication:

HEAD QUARTERS, June 23, 1836.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose copies of reports from Major General Patterson and Captain Parrot, by which you will observe that little remains to be done. Jim Henry is still out with about one hundred and fifty warriors; but my Indian warriors, who have halted and await my orders at the Big Spring, say they can take him. I have just received information that a Seminole chief, with a number of his warriors, is with Henry; the information comes from a negro taken last night.

I have the honor to be, General,

Your obedient servant,

THOS. S. JESUP

Major General Commanding.

Major General Scott,

Commanding Southern Army on the march.

See Senate document No. 224, 21 session 24th Congress, page 474, for this communication and others, showing the conclusion of the war by surrenders of the balance of the hostiles.

Here ended the Creek war, by the prompt and efficient conduct of General Jesup, in contradiction to the orders of General Scott. If the orders of General Scott had not been opposed by General Jesup, and at the precise time that they were, we

would have had another Florida business of it: the Creek war, in all probability, would have remained undetermined for years, and would have cost the Government, like the Florida war, twenty or thirty millions—perhaps more. Had General Jesup complied with the order of General Scott, "ceased all operations, and marched his troops and encamped near Fort Mitchell," his volunteers would have abandoned him, and returned to their homes, cursing him for a coward. The warriors whom he had brought over would have dubbed him with the title of *squaw*, and would have dispersed and joined the hostiles. Yes, sir, all this would have been the result of obedience to General Scott's orders. But, I repeat, by the prompt, fearless and efficient discharge of his duty, an end was put to the war; more than a thousand prisoners were taken, and in a few days four or five hundred more surrendered, in all over fourteen hundred, who were, with many others that subsequently came in by the solicitations of the friendly chiefs, sent west of the Mississippi; I think near twenty thousand in all. I believe General Jesup had the superintendence of their removal. But, notwithstanding this gallant and successful conduct, General Scott severely censured General Jesup for disobeying his orders!!!

General Jesup's course met the entire approbation of the Executive, and the War Department. General Scott was recalled from Alabama, owing, I have little doubt, to the slowness of his movements and to a knowledge of the fact that General Scott's censure of General Jesup was unmerited. The Creek war being ended, General Jesup was ordered to proceed to Florida and take charge of the war. He proceeded some time in October, and to which we will now return with our history.

I believe General Jesup was directed to act with Governor Call, or to take charge of the war in chief, I do not know which—I believe the latter. He went through a portion of Florida with a small detachment of mounted men, to join Governor Call; and on his way he surprised an Indian village, and took forty-two prisoners of Indians and negroes, from which he returned to Withlacoochee, and swept the swamps from the Fort King road to Fort Clinch, near the mouth of the river, in which he captured between eighty and a hundred of the enemy. But finding there was no body of the enemy in that section, he detached a part of his force, under Col. Foster and Major Nelson, of Georgia, to the swamps south of the Withlacoochee, on the Gulf of Mexico, and returned himself, with the remainder of his force, to Fort Armstrong, on the Fort King road. Soon after he pushed, with a force of one thousand troops, consisting of regulars, marines, Alabama volunteers, and Indian warriors, into the centre of the peninsula, where, it is said, a white man had never been before. On his way he sent a detachment against the village of Osuchee, which surprised the chief, Osuchee, killed him, his son, and two other chiefs, took a number of prisoners, (some of whom escaped,) after which the detachment returned and joined him. He proceeded with all his force to the neighborhood of the Lake Tohopekalgee. Here the advance of the army under Col. Henderson, came up with the enemy, attacked them, killed some, and took a number of prisoners. The result of

this battle led to a conference with the Indian chiefs, and the conference to a suspension of hostilities. The chiefs agreed to, and did meet General Jesup at Fort Dade, and entered into a capitulation to leave the country and go west of the Mississippi. Two or three of the chiefs were retained as hostages for the fulfilment of the capitulation. Some time before this, General Jesup had ordered a detachment of troops, under the command of Colonels Fanning and Harney, with a quantity of provisions, up the St. Johns river to Lake Monroe, where they established a post. They were attacked by the Indians. The enemy, were repulsed, with the loss of twenty or thirty killed. Soon after this battle, the Indians heard of the suspension of hostilities, and a friendly intercourse was established. All this led to a general suspension of hostilities throughout the Territory, and a friendly intercourse with all; and, by an agreement entered into at Fort Dade, the chiefs being nearly all present, (and those who were not, sent in their adhesion.) The Indians were to assemble at Tampa Bay, in May, 1837, and, from there, start for the West. Here was a complete and successful termination of the Florida war, and it was accomplished in as short a time as any Indian war since the first settlement of our country.

In conformity with the stipulations, the Indians began to assemble in the latter part of May, and beginning of June, at Tampa Bay and Fort Mellon, to prepare for the West; but unfortunately the measles broke out among those at Tampa Bay. Safety to the army and humanity to the Indians required that they should be kept apart—to the army, that the contagion might not be spread in it, and humanity to the Indians, that they should be kept at a place, and in a situation, with respect to water and other advantages, to make the disease less fatal. The disease raged with great violence, and many whole families were swept off. The news of the disease reached Fort Mellon, where a large body had assembled, and many of them were furnished with provisions to take them to Tampa Bay. It was also reported at Fort Mellon that the smallpox raged among the Indians at Tampa Bay. All this prevented those at Fort Mellon, and many others, who had not yet assembled, from going to Tampa Bay. General Jesup was thus prevented by circumstances over which he had no control, from carrying the stipulations of the treaty into effect, by moving the Indians West, at the time when it was intended. While preparations were making to move the Indians from Fort Mellon to Tampa Bay, they became jealous of the intention of the army, and thought the object was to throw them all into a body where they might, or would, be swept off by the measles and smallpox—took the alarm, broke up, and dispersed in direct violation of the conditions of the capitulation.

It has been asked, why did General Jesup not retain and prevent the Indians from breaking up? why did he not pursue and overtake them, when broken up? The answer is, the efficiency of the army was greatly weakened by severe fatigue, long marches, and constant and severe exercise; and the horses were completely broken down. General Jesup did all that was in his power, and all that

was left for him to do at that time. He called some fresh troops of Florida volunteers into action, the efficient troops which he had, and two volunteer companies from Georgia. They were put to the service of scouting and defending the frontier. This duty was continued until the following November, which may be regarded as the commencement of the next campaign.

The number of Indians killed or taken in the campaign which I have briefly described, by General Jesup, was over five hundred. I will not now detain the House with specific details of the military operations of General Jesup, for the balance of the time he had charge of the Florida war, but refer you to Senate document No. 507, second session of the Twenty fifth Congress, by which it will be seen he continued to defend the frontier, to scour the country far and wide, as his means and force would enable him, and to surprise, kill, and capture the enemy when and wherever he could find them; by which, also, it will be found that from the time he commenced operations, or took charge of the war in Florida, which was in December, 1836, until he withdrew in May, 1838, the number of Indians and negroes taken, with those who surrendered, amounted to near twenty-four hundred, over seven hundred of whom were warriors. Their villages were all destroyed—their cattle, horses, and other stock, with nearly all their other property, were taken or destroyed—the hammocks and swamps were every where penetrated, and the whole country was traversed from the Georgia line to the southern extremity of Florida. The small hands of the enemy which were left, were dispersed over that extensive region, with little left but their rifles. Such was the condition of the war, and such the situation of the enemy, when Gen. Jesup surrendered the command.

Mr. Chairman, I have traced up the principal operations of the Florida War. I have done so for the purpose of presenting to the country the prominent facts, in order that it may be known how far the Administration or the Executive, and the War Department, are chargeable with any misfortunes or delay attending the prosecution of that war. I have also done so for the purpose of placing the officers, who were the immediate active operators in the war, in a proper manner before the public, to the end that justice may be awarded to whom justice is due.

In relation to the Executive and the War Department no blame can or will be attached, if blame there is at all, and such will be the decision of an intelligent and generous community. The Executive was thwarted in his efforts to augment the regular army; hence the War Department was driven to the necessity of carrying on the war with volunteer militia, a mode both expensive and uncertain. Vast expense and delay has been the consequence, but the Executive could do no better. He was compelled to use such means as Congress furnished him, and for these alone is he responsible. All responsibility and all consequences must rest with Congress for the insufficiency of those means. Congress is also responsible for all the unhappy consequences that resulted from the untimely interference to which I have alluded, for the purposes of pacification, and by which the whole operations of the War

Department were checked and thrown into confusion. I repeat that nothing that was in the power of the Executive and the War Department to do, was left undone. The best judgment has been exercised, and the best direction has been given to that judgment. I repeat, whatever failures or delay are connected with the Florida war, so far as the Executive is concerned, resulted from the want of more efficient means. I also repeat, that whatever inefficiency may seem to attach to the Executive, has its origin in the want of proper means. Lastly, I repeat, whatever failures or delay are connected with the Florida war, have their foundation in the want of more efficient means, and are chargeable to Congress and the character of the country. But, sir, speaking with reference to the means with which the Executive has been furnished, I ask to present some other causes which have operated unfavorably, and must so continue to operate, to a speedy termination of that war. I have given a description of the face of Florida. The advantages which the swamps, hammocks, everglades, and morasses, give the savages, render all civilized modes of warfare ineffectual. The swamps are almost impenetrable except to the savages, who know their secret passes. The hammocks and everglades form a covering and hiding places for the savages, which render them impervious to the keenest eye and the most vigilant search. The first warning the pursuer has of the enemy is the crack of his rifle, or the effect of his shot. I am told that one of the officers of the Florida service has been shot at (and wounded often) fourteen times in various attacks, and never saw a hostile Indian, such is the security the enemy enjoy by the natural advantages which the face of Florida gives them. Add to this the extent or spread of territory which covers over forty thousand square miles, over which the enemy are dispersed in small banditti. Add to these the fact that, though Florida is destitute of resources for a civilized army, it abounds in natural productions, suited to an Indian. The wild potato, the coont root, and the cabbage tree, are the substitutes for bread. The fish, with which the lakes and ponds abound, the gofer, the turkey, and the deer, which they know where to find, and how to kill, are their meat. It is entirely impossible, and must ever remain so, to starve them out, for nature feeds them without an effort, scarcely, on their part; and as to clothing, the climate renders that not only unnecessary, but, for three-fourths of the year, actually burdensome. A warrior disdains to encumber himself with garments beyond his buckskin leggins, moccasins, and breech-clout.

The Florida contest is really no longer a war of *fighting*; it is one of *hunting, finding, and catching*—the difficulties of which may be imagined, but can only be realized by those who have been practical observers of its operations. Nothing is more unfair and unjust than to compare this war with other Indian wars known to our country; for there is, in truth, scarcely one feature that will bear comparison. To drive the Indians from our frontier, to push them farther into the wilderness, and enlarge our boundaries, has been the common policy, as the history of our frontier Indian wars shows; but such is not the character of the war in Florida.

The Indians would long since have abandoned that country, if they had had a place of retreat, as the Indians of the West have always had. But, surrounded as they are, by the Gulf of Mexico on one side, by the Atlantic ocean on another, and the inhabited States on the third, they are unable to recede from the country, even under the severest pressure. They are therefore reduced to the necessity of hiding themselves in the numerous covers with which the country abounds, and we to that of *seeking* for them. The operation of finding, running down, and catching, some twelve or fifteen hundred wild Indians, scattered over a *area* of forty thousand square miles of wilderness, covered with inaccessible retreats and fastnesses, will be found to be fraught with difficulties which have never been met with in this country nor surpassed in any other.

If the Indians would concentrate and fight a decisive battle, there is perhaps not a regiment in Florida that could not close the war forever by defeating them. But such is not their policy. They know their strength consists in dispersion, not in concentration. By scattering in small squads over that immense territory, they see that we can neither find nor effectually assail them. They, in fact, become intangible to military operations. Hence the war may linger through many years, with the utmost effort that *may* be used to terminate it, and it is the opinion of many most experienced in the progress of this war, that *time* is to be an important element in bringing it to a close, and that no better plan can be devised for that purpose than that now in operation by the War Department, and carrying out the provisions of the occupation bill now before the House.

Mr. Chairman, while I am willing that unprincipled demagogues, and brainless coxcombs, shall exercise full sway in their denunciations of the Administration for what they please to call the failure of the Florida war, I will ask the attention of an honest and intelligent community, while I present for their consideration some other wars in other countries, but answering the description of this, with the exception of the single change of names; in the progress and conduct of which they will find ample reasons for the delays of this—reasons which, with them, will be found amply sufficient to secure the Administration from disgrace, or even imputation, and the American arms from dishonor.

Darius, King of Persia, to satisfy an unbounded ambition, and extend his conquests, declared war against the Scythians. His brother, Ariabanes, in whom he had great confidence, remonstrated against this expedition, and offered, among other strong objections, that the Scythians were separated from Persia by an immense distance of sea and land; and besides, the Scythians were a people that dwelt in wild and uncultivated deserts, having neither towns nor houses; no fixed settlements or places of habitation. * * * As they are accustomed to remove from place to place, if they should think proper to fly before you, not out of fear or cowardice, for they are a very courageous and warlike people, but only with a design to harass and ruin your army by continued and fatiguing marches; what will become of you in such an uncultivated and barren country, where you will

neither find forage for your horses nor provisions for your men? * * * Darius heard his brother in kindness, but no admonition was sufficient to drive him from his mad purpose. He commenced his march from Susa at the head of seven hundred thousand troops. His fleet consisted of six hundred ships, which were chiefly managed by Ionians, and other Grecian nations that dwelt upon the sea coast of Asia Minor and the Hellespont. He marched his army towards the Thracian Bosphorus, which he passed upon a bridge of boats; after which, having made himself master of all Thrace, he came to the Danube, where he had ordered his fleet to meet him. As soon as the Scythians were informed of the march of Darius against them, knowing their want of strength to meet him, they applied to the neighboring people to join in their defence, some of whom gave in, but most of whom preferred neutral ground; but of this refusal they soon had reason to repent.

The first wise precaution taken by the Scythians was, to secure their wives and children, by sending them to the most northern parts of the country, and with them all their herds and flocks, reserving nothing for themselves but that which they could carry with them, and what was necessary for the support of the army. Another precaution which they observed was, to fill up all the wells, stop up all their springs, and consume all the forage in those parts through which the Persian army was to pass. The policy then practised was to march a short distance before Darius's army, and lead them first into the countries of those who refused to join them against the Persians, to the end that their substance might be consumed by so vast an army. This being accomplished, they led the enemy into barren regions, where there was neither water, provisions, nor forage—retreating but a short distance before, and leading him into such places as suited them best. Whenever the Persians manifested a disposition to attack them, they would quicken their march and lead them still farther into famine and thirst. At last Darius seeing no hopes of bringing the enemy to battle, and growing weary of long and fruitless marches, sent a herald to the king of the Scythians, whose name was Indirhyrus, with this message in his name: "*Prince of the Scythians, wherefore dost thou continually fly before me? Why dost thou not stop somewhere or other, either to give me battle if thou believest thyself able to encounter me, or if thou thinkest thyself too weak to acknowledge thy master by presenting him with earth and water?*"

To this communication Indirhyrus replied by the same herald: "*If I fly before thee, Prince of the Persians, it is not because I fear thee. What I do now is no more than what I am used to do in time of peace. We Scythians have neither cities nor lands to defend. If thou hast a mind to force us to come to an engagement, come and attack the tombs of our fathers, and thou shall find what manner of men we are. As to the title of master which thou assumest, keep it for other nations than the Scythians. For my part, I acknowledge no other master than the great Jupiter, one of my own an-*

* The ancient method of acknowledging submission and servitude to the conqueror.

cestors, and the goddess *Vesta*." Darius was greatly enraged at what he regarded so insolent an answer, and pushed further and faster in his mad career. Just when his army was reduced to the last extremity, there came a herald to Darius from the Scythian prince with a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows, for a present. The king desired to know the meaning of those gifts. The herald answered that his orders were only to deliver them, and nothing more; and that it was left for the Persian king to find out the meaning. Darius concluded, at first, that the Scythians thereby consented to deliver up the earth and water to him which, he supposed, were represented by the mouse and frog, as also their cavalry, whose swiftness was represented by the bird, together with their own persons and arms, represented by the arrows. But one of his lords expounded the enigma in a different manner. "I know," says he to the Persians, that, unless you can fly away in the air like birds, or hide yourselves in the earth like mice, or swim in the water like frogs, you shall in no wise avoid the arrows of the Scythians.

The whole Persian army had now nothing before their eyes but ruin and famine. Instant retreat was all the salvation for the remainder of those who survived the famine and fatigue of the Scythian campaign. Darius returned to Susa with scarce half his army. Such was the fate of the Scythian war; such was the failure of one of the most powerful nations on the face of the earth, with one of the most powerful armies that ever marched against an enemy, headed by a prince flushed with victory, and adorned with fresh laurels by the conquest of Assyria and the destruction of Babylon, in an attempt to subdue a small nation of half civilized wanderers; and such were the advantages which the face of the country and the extent of territory gave the Scythians—advantages in no respect superior to those enjoyed by the Seminoles in Florida for their defence. The Scythians defeated the Persian army by wandering, and not fighting. The Seminole Indians have it in their power to long prevent a termination of the Florida war by wandering, and not fighting, by the same advantages that the Scythians enjoyed.

In the year 1655 Jamaica was conquered by the English, and the Spaniards driven out. Soon after the English laws were established in the island, the inhabitants found themselves beset and plundered by some wandering robbers who issued from the mountains of Clarendon, situated in the interior of the island. These robbers were called maroons, and principally consisted of negroes and their descendants, who, from time to time, had escaped from their masters, and taken refuge in the mountains, or cockpits. The mountains of Clarendon are lofty, remarkably broken, consisting of rocks, covered, in some parts, with dense shrubbery, with narrow, deep defiles, leading to openings more expanded, called cockpits, and other hiding places, fit for secure retreats for robbers and plunderers. The earliest attention of the colonial Government was given to the security of the planters and herdsmen from the daily depredations of the maroons. Garrisons and posts were established, troops were sta-

tioned at suitable points to defend the frontier, but all to but little effect. Robberies, depredations on property, and murders, by the maroons, was a portion of every day's news. The attention of the colonial Government was called and directed more earnestly and urgently to the safety of the frontier and the reduction of the maroons; but all still to little effect—murders and depredations were but little abated—the work of surprise, plunder, and death, still went on. The attention of the British Parliament was called to the maroon war; but year after year passed away and the maroon war still raged. The British arms were called into active requisition, troops of rangers were sent to scour the mountain passes, defiles, and cockpits, but no maroons could be seen, with a few exceptions. Fresh trails would be made on purpose to lead the rangers into narrow defiles, when, on a sudden, the maroons would fire on them from their hiding places and cut off whole companies, without any other discovery than the report of the musket, the smoke from its muzzle, and the death which ensued. Sir, I have not time to detail this war and its bloody consequences. It is sufficient for my purpose to say that perhaps there never were over one thousand maroon warriors at any one time, and yet the war lasted near two thirds of a century, with but little intermission of confirmed peace. It is sufficient to say that such were the advantages that the inaccessible (inaccessible to any thing but a maroon) passes, narrow defiles, cockpits, and hiding places that the Clarendon mountains afforded the maroons, that a handful of them (comparatively speaking) were able to keep at bay the power of the British arms. While the British lion was prowling uncared over vast and wide-spread India, shaking the earth and making all creation tremble at his roar, he was compelled to shake his mane and sneak, in dismay and defeat, from the presence of a handful of maroons. Such were the natural advantages which the maroons enjoyed, owing to the face of their country. But, great as those advantages were, the Seminoles enjoy those that are equal for their mode of warfare, and against which the American arms have had to contend. The maroon war was finally closed in 1796, not before; nor would it yet have been closed, but for the importation of the Spanish chas-seurs and bloodhounds, about which I will have to say something before I take my seat.

In that part of Asia, or, perhaps, more properly, in Asia in Russia, are what are called the Circassian mountains, which are inhabited by a people called after the mountains, or perhaps the mountains are called after them. Be that as it may, the people are called Circassians. The Government of Russia has owned that province of Asia for perhaps a century or more. Her arms and her laws have been extended to the subjection of all the tribes and nations within the limits of that province, except the Circassians, who have never been conquered to this day. Perhaps the description given of the Clarendon mountains of Jamaica may, to some extent, serve for a description of the Circassian mountains; and the advantages of the one are similar to the other, for national defence. The Circassians, I believe, rank with what is called half civilized people. I

think their concentrated military force has, at no time, exceeded one or two thousand warriors. The arms of Russia have been directed against that people, with but little intermission, from the time she has owned the province. Campaign after campaign has marched, with ten, fifteen, and upwards of twenty thousand troops, as brave as ever bore arms, or followed the Russian standard; and as often as they have been marched, so often have they failed, or been defeated. The Russian eagle, that hovers over, unscared, one half of the continent of inhabited Europe, has been compelled to flee from the presence of a handful of Circassians, in defeat and dismay. Ten thousand of Russia's bravest veterans have fallen in a single campaign before them. They are unconquered and unconquerable, so long as their scattered, small clans, remain united for the common defence of their country, and so long as the mountains stand, and the passes, fastnesses, and defiles remain; for these are the natural advantages by which they are enabled to contend against the almost unlimited powers of a Russian Autocrat; and yet the natural advantages that the Circassian mountains afford that people in the safety of their retreats, does not excel the advantages the everglades, swamps, and hammocks secure to the Seminoles in Florida.

The failures of the Persian army to defeat Scythia; the procrastination for more than half a century of the maroon war, and the total failure of a Russia to conquer Circassia, can all be accounted for by the honest, intelligent and candid world, and yet this Administration must be the subject of Federal derision, ridicule and denunciation, because the Florida war has not been terminated in the space of two or three years, with all the insurmountable difficulties that have their foundation in nature to contend with—limited means, a destitution in resources at the theatre of war, and the untimely and embarrassing interposition of Congress—all of which have conspired to make this war as complicated and as difficult of termination as those to which I have referred.

Sir, the spirit of persecution and demagoguism which has hunted the Executive and the War Department, as well as some of the officers, through this war, is worthy of, and in character with, the reckless demagogues of other times and other Governments, who are always prepared to sacrifice the highest interest of their country at the shrine of their ambition. It is worthy of the ingratitude and inhumanity of an Apries, when the Egyptians determined to shake off the yoke that bound them down in slavish bondage to Apries (Pharaoh Hophrah) they made Amasis their king, Apries in exasperation sent Paterbenis, one of his highest officers and principal lord of his court, to put Amasis under arrest and bring him before him. Paterbenis, faithful to his prince, did all he could to execute his master's order; but, for want of power and means, failed in his commission. The base and brutal Apries, as a reward for his fidelity, treated him in a most ignominious and inhuman manner, by cutting off his nose and ears, for failing to do that which he had neither the power nor the means to do.

It is in character with the base conduct and treachery of Hanno, and the vile faction he headed in Carthage, whose whole efforts were directed to

the destruction of the immortal Hannibal, whose success in arms, and whose popularity with his people, were a constant source of mortification and disappointment to him. The management of the Government of Carthage, and the command of her armies, were Hanno's ambition; and, like the Federal demagogues of this day in our country, he preferred to see the proud name of Carthage wither, her arms dishonored, and her people sunk in infamy and sold in slavery, rather than fail of his object; and such aspiring demagogues have been the misfortune and curse of every Government and people, at all times. So says the history of the world and of man. But I will not now take time to illustrate by examples. The American people will be able to appreciate the motives that gave birth to the base charges against the Administration in reference to the Florida war.

Mr. Chairman, I ask your attention, while I expose the inconsistency involved in the cry against the Administration for what is called the "mismanagement of the Florida war." The Executive and the War Department have been charged with impotency in its management, and General Jesup has been brought in for a large share of Federal abuse and Federal censure. Of the Administration I will say nothing more, farther than repeat, that all that has been done, has been done with the best directed judgment.

But of General Jesup I must say something, by way of contrast to the services of General Scott.

General Jesup served, I think, hardly a fortnight in the Creek war, and by his efficient means, and in violation of the orders, and contrary to the plans, of General Scott, he succeeded in terminating the war, and completed the arrangements by which near twenty thousand Indians were moved west of the Mississippi. For this, as I have before remarked, he received General Scott's censure.

General Jesup served in Florida, and had charge of the war a little over seventeen months, in which time he killed and captured of the enemy near twenty-four hundred, defended the frontier, established posts and fortifications, destroyed the enemy's property, burnt their towns, swept the swamps and hammocks, and dispersed the small remainder, and yet General Jesup has been abused and denounced in no measured terms by the Federal sheets of the day; he has been identified with the War Department in the charge of "impotency" and the "disgrace of the Florida war."

General Scott performed a campaign in Florida with near five thousand troops (the bravest of the brave) well supplied, in which he may have killed, it is said, five or six of the enemy, and yet, strange to say, General Scott, by the same men and the same party, is lauded for his bravery and his transcendent military services, and is held up as qualified for and entitled to the first office in the gift of the American people. Yes, sir, he was really a prominent candidate for the Presidency at the late Hartford Convention. (Pardon me, sir, I should have said Harrisburg. I am so in the habit of calling things by their proper names, that I sometimes violate the rules of courtesy. The fact that it was composed of men of the same party, governed by the same principles, and whose object was to effect about the same purposes as that of the Hartford conven-

tion, led me into the nominal mistake. I will be more careful hereafter.) Yes, sir, General Scott, who, of all the officers that had charge of the Florida war, with greater means and greater advantages, did the least, (except one whom I shall name shortly,) is held up by the Opposition as worthy and qualified for the Presidency!

Sir, if there is any disgrace attached to the conduct of the Florida war, or any failure in its management, that disgrace, and that failure, must attach to General Scott. If there was any thing left undone, which could or ought to have been done, in the Florida war, it was the failure of General Scott to fight, surround, and conquer the enemy, when they were embodied on the Withlacoochee river. At no time, during the war, were there so great a number of the enemy embodied as on the Withlacoochee, when General Scott met them. At no time were there so many efficient troops so contiguous, nor were the troops at any time so well supplied, as were the troops at that time under Gen. Scott. He had nineteen hundred and sixty men in his right wing, immediately under his command, with sixteen days' provisions. His left wing was at Palaklakah, consisting of the same number of men, and the same quantity of provisions, and with cattle in abundance, and only one or two days' march from where the Indians were embodied. Then was the time for a decisive battle, if such a battle could have been fought with the Indians at any time. If there was ever a time when an end could have been put to the Florida war by efficient and prompt action, that was the time. If ever there were circumstances which put it in the power of any commander in Florida to put, at one blow, an end to the war, these were the circumstances. What was the course of General Scott? It was, as I have remarked, to attack the Indians, who, without the loss of one man, retreated to the swamps. General Scott followed them but four or five miles, and then took up the line of march for Tampa Bay, where he arrived in eleven days from Fort Drane, with seven days' provisions, and where he met the left wing of his army, with a like quantity of provisions. Sir, one is naturally led to inquire why Gen. Scott did not send to Palaklakah for the left wing of his army, secure a few of the enemy's cattle which were in such abundance, attack the enemy with his whole force, and at a blow put an end to the war. It has been confidently said by some officers of experience, that if General Gaines or General Jesup had commanded at that time at Withlacoochee, with the forces and provisions that General Scott had, an end would have been put to the war by a decisive battle. It is said that it was a great error in General Scott to permit the Indians to disperse. They never have since been so embodied, nor will they ever again be so embodied. I repeat, that there and then was committed the fatal error, if any error can be justly charged in the conduct of the Florida war. I charge this upon General Scott, and I defy his friends to get him from under the charge, unless they will maintain that owing to the character and face of the country and the advantages of the swamps, hammocks, and fastnesses the enemy enjoyed, it was impossible for him to find and defeat them; and such seems to be the case, and the apology upon which the court of

inquiry decided, as set forth in Senate document 224, evidence furnished the court by Gen. Scott himself. I say, if the friends of Gen. Scott assign these as good reasons why he so signally failed in the Florida war, then must they cease their clamor against the Administration, and their charges of inefficiency and "impetency" upon the head of the War Department for not doing that which they must acknowledge was impossible to be done, or they must consent to let their would-be President stand charged with more inefficiency and greater error, than any one officer connected with the Florida war—no one having it so much in his power to end the war as General Scott.

I was amused to hear the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. Thompson,] when on this subject, (Florida war.) He asks:

"What has yet been accomplished by the Second dragoons, a regiment raised specially for that service? Nothing, that I have ever heard of. I would not object to raising one or more regiments, if I knew who were to command them; if I could have any assurance that the command would be given to Gen. Floyd of Georgia, or some other such man. I, however, know none such. But it will be given to no such man, but to some palace pet or noisy politician. These appointments have been, and will be made, not with a view to military, but to political battles; not with a view to obtaining victories over the Indians, but votes at elections."

He knows no such man as Gen. Floyd! Ought the gentleman not to have embraced Gen. Scott and the hero of Tippecanoe?

But, sir, who is Gen. Floyd? I may expose my ignorance by asking this question. If so, I hope I will find an apology in the fact that some of us in the West have no books to read but the Bible and old Tom Dilworth's Spelling-book. I do not make the inquiry with any disrespect to the gentleman, who seems to stand so high in the estimation of the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. T.] Gen. Floyd may have slain his thousands and tens of thousands. He may have fattened many a broad field with his slain. He may have planted standards of liberty in every quarter of the globe. Victory may perch upon his banner, and conqueror may be his name, but it so happens I know little or nothing of him. I believe he had the charge of a campaign in Florida. I think he was sent to do what Gen. Nelson had failed to do. And what did they both do? Senate document No. 507 informs us that Gen. Nelson, with a brigade of Georgia volunteers, was directed to scour the frontier of Middle Florida and the western part of East Florida. His operations covered the country west of the Fort King road, from the south point of the Annullalega swamp to the Withlacoochee, and to the head of that river; thence to the Suwanee, and thence west of that river, and south of the Tallahassee road to Stein Hatchee, the whole distance on the coast being a continued swamp, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the interior, from ten to thirty miles, and along the Gulf a hundred and fifty miles. He had several skirmishes with the enemy, and the result of his operations, so far as they have been reported, are six Indians killed, and fourteen prisoners. That is something. General Nelson is a Democrat, I am told.

Now, sir, I have told you I did not know what General Floyd has done, but I can tell you what he did not do. After General Nelson left Florida, General Floyd went on a campaign. His opera-

tions were confined to the southern part of Georgia, and northern line of Florida, near the Okefenoke swamp. His force I think consisted of near one thousand Georgia volunteers and United States regular troops. His campaign continued probably three months. He returned without killing one Indian or taking a prisoner. This is what he did not do. I believe General Floyd is a modern Whig!

"The King of France, with forty thousand men,
Marched up a hill, and then marched down again."

But my friend from South Carolina knows no such man as General Floyd. He does not like pets of the white palace, and noisy politicians; I suppose he prefers bank pets. I take it for granted, if the charge of the Florida war could be put into the hands of the pets of the bank-marbled palace and the friends of rotten corporations; the rag-tag-and-bone-plaster currency and incorporated swindlers, they might make as much "noise" as they pleased in politics. Such generals would be to the gentleman's liking and the liking of his party, whether they would obtain "*victories over the Indians*" or not, so that they would "*obtain votes at the polls*."

But, sir, I wish it to be understood that I neither make the inquiry nor the expose which I have, in relation to General Floyd, through any disrespect to that gentleman, or to diminish any claims to chivalry, bravery, or good conduct, he may have achieved by his services in the Florida war. On the contrary, it is my desire that he shall enjoy all the credit to which his services entitle him. But when his friends are so imprudent as to extol him, at the expense, and to the exclusion, of all others who toiled with him in the scenes of Florida, a plain, unvarnished statement of facts is not only admissible, but demanded, in justice to those who may be affected thereby. And I am willing to admit that General Floyd did all that could have been done under the circumstances in which he served.

I have stated that the abused General Jesup ended the Creek war in ten or fifteen days, and sent near twenty thousand Indians west of the Mississippi; and that he killed, captured, and took prisoners, near twenty-four hundred of the enemy, in less than seventeen months, during which he had charge of the Florida war. How will these compare with other Indian campaigns and Indian wars.

General Wayne's Indian campaign commenced in 1792, and ended in 1795. Wayne's last battle was fought on the 20th August, 1794. The Indians did not come in for a year after, and, when all told, they did not amount to more than eleven hundred.

General G. R. Clark, who was considered one of our most successful Indian hunters, never took more than one hundred and fifty Indians; nor did he kill more than twice that number. Generals Scott (not the would-be President) and Wilkinson killed and captured ninety-nine Indians in their campaign, for which they received the thanks of General Washington.

In the surprise at Tippecanoe it is supposed fifty Indians may have been killed with the offset of one hundred and eighty of our troops killed and wounded.

So Gen. Jesup, in a seventeen months' campaign, killed and captured, and made prisoner, more Indians

than all killed and taken by Wayne, Clark, Scott, Wilkinson, and Tippecanoe to boot; and yet the Administration, the War Department, and General Jesup, are charged with disgrace for failures in the Florida war, and General Winfield Scott must be made President of the United States. Monstrous!!! and Tippecanoe more monstrous!!!!

Mr. Chairman, I regret that my time and the limits of a speech will not permit me to take the notice I should of many of the gallant officers who served in the fatiguing and harassing war of Florida. If I had time and opportunity, it would give me great pleasure to annex the services of the gallant Smith, Taylor, Hernandez, Cawfield, Harny, Fauning, and others, to their names.

I have a word to say, by way of conclusion, to the charge made upon the War Department of importing bloodhounds to hunt down the Seminole Indians.

This charge is made by the humane Federalists. Humanity is one of the noblest qualities of the human heart, but it sometimes requires the exercise of sound judgment, to give it a proper direction; and unfeigned humanity is generally blended with some regard for truth and veracity. We had a very humane party during our last war with Great Britain, in which we were struggling to maintain our liberty and independence. That was the Federal party who, for the time, styled themselves the *peace party*, and the same party whose eyes are now pumping, and whose hearts are bleeding, at the thought of employing bloodhounds to hunt the poor Seminoles. At the same time that the whole line of our frontier country was bleeding at every pore; when the heavens were illuminated by night with the torch of the savage and the conflagration of the frontier cabins along the whole northern boundary; when the crack of the deadly rifle was not permitted to die on the ear; when the red-scalping knife and tomahawk were never permitted to dry; and when the work of death was the daily and nightly occupation of the enemy, many a loud and fervent prayer was sent to Heaven by the peace party to revenge, on our countrymen, the blood of an unholy and unjust war. And now, when the first intelligence of the morning is the indiscriminate slaughter of one or more families, the burning of one or more houses, by the Seminoles, we hear the same party petitioning men and Heaven against employing bloodhounds to trace the enemy to their lurking places and inaccessible retreats—for no other use is intended by them.

The Florida Indians are perhaps the most treacherous and inhuman savages that ever degraded the human name, or deformed the image of man. They are composed of every material that is vile and abominable in human nature and degraded in principle.

In the course of this war, they have not only placed themselves without the pale of mercy and humanity, by their inhuman and indiscriminate barbarity, but they have made themselves, by the laws of nations and of war, subjects of the gallows, by the violations of the capitulation solemnly entered into at Fort Dade, which I have before described; and this is the kind of enemy against which bloodhounds must not be used, for

the purpose of ferreting out their places of concealment.

Every wind from Florida bears upon its wings the sickening intelligence of some innocent family falling a sacrifice to these plundering murderers. The intelligence of the parents of some family having their throats cut, their cabin fired, and their children's brains dashed out upon its burning logs, and the mangled bodies left to fatten the wolf, and feed the raven. But all this can be heard with cold indifference, while the piteous wailing is spread upon a thousand petitions against employing blood hounds, to hunt the poor Seminoles. Sir, it is all the slang of the demagogue, and the cant of the hypocrite. I have in my possession an extract from Governor Reid's message to the Florida Legislature, which gives a description of one of those horrible scenes of murder and burning. It is said that a pious and exemplary citizen, on seeing the mangled corpses and the smoking ruins of the dwelling, exclaimed, in feeling and horror, that he would employ hell hounds and devils against such an enemy.

But the Executive and the War Department have been assailed and denounced from one end of the Union to the other, for importing blood hounds, to be used in the Florida war. Now, sir, I have to inform you that the whole charge is but one of the reckless, unprincipled, and vile slanders of the times, propagated and promulgated for the base purposes of party. Neither the Executive nor the War Department have had any hand in the importation of blood hounds. It is the work of the Florida authorities, a matter over which the Executive and the War Department have no control, except whether they shall be used as instruments of war in the hands of the United States troops, or, if permitted, in what manner they shall be used.

I present the reply of the Secretary of the War Department to a communication of the Hon. H. A. Wise to him on that subject, which I ask may be read by the Clerk, and which I shall make a part of my printed remarks.

The Clerk read as follows, Senate Document 187, 1st session 26th Congress, page 4:

On this letter I endorsed the following decision, which was communicated to General Taylor: "I have always been of opinion that dogs ought to be employed in this warfare, to protect the army from surprises and ambushes, and to track the Indian to his lurking-place; but supposed, if the General believed them to be necessary, he would not hesitate to take measures to procure them. The cold-blooded and inhuman murders lately perpetrated upon helpless women and children by these ruthless savages, render it expedient that every possible means should be resorted to, in order to protect the people of Florida, and to enable the United States forces to follow and capture or destroy the savage and unrelenting foe. General Taylor is, therefore, authorized to procure such number of dogs as he may judge necessary, it being expressly understood that they are to be employed to track and discover the Indians, not to worry or destroy them."

This is the only action or correspondence, on the part of the Department, that has ever taken place in relation to the matter. The General took no measures to carry into effect his own recommendation, and this Department has never since renewed the subject. I continue, however, to entertain the opinion expressed in the above decision. I do not believe that description of dog, called the bloodhound, necessary to preset surprise, or track the Indian murderer; but I still think that every cabin, every military post, and every detachment, should be attended by dogs. That precaution might have saved Dade's command from massacre; and, by giving timely warning, have prevented many of the cruel murders which have been committed by the Indians in Middle Florida. The only successful pursuit of Indian murderers that I know of, was on a late occasion, when the

pursuers were aided by the sagacity of their dogs. These savages had approached a cabin of peaceful and industrious settlers so stealthily, that the first notice of their presence was given by a volley from their rifles thrust between the logs of the house; and the work of death was finished by tomahawking the women, after tearing from their infant children, and dashing their brains out against the door posts. Are these ruthless savages to escape and repeat such scenes of blood, because they can elude our fellow citizens in Florida and our regular soldiers, and baffie their unaided efforts to overtake or discover them? On a late occasion, three estimable citizens were killed in the immediate neighborhood of St. Augustine, and one officer of distinguished merit mortally wounded. It is in evidence that these murders were committed by two Indians, who, after shooting down the father, and beating out the son's brains with the butts of their rifles, upon hearing the approach of the volunteers, retired a few yards into the woods, and secreted themselves until the troops returned to town with the dead bodies of those who had been thus inhumanly and wantonly butchered. It is to be regretted that this corps had not been accompanied with one or two hunters, who, with their dogs, might have tracked the blood-stained footsteps of these Indians, have restored to liberty the captive they were dragging away with them, and have prevented them from ever again repeating such atrocities. Nor could the severest casuist object to our fellow-citizens in Florida resorting to such measures, in order to protect the lives of their women and children.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. HENRY A. WISE,
House of Representatives.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 26, 1840.

Sir: It is understood by the Department, although not officially informed of the fact, that the authorities of the Territory of Florida have imported a pack of bloodhounds from the island of Cuba, and I think it proper to direct, in the event of those dogs being employed by any officer or officers under your command, that their use be confined altogether to tracking the Indians; and in order to insure this, and to prevent the possibility of their injuring any person whatsoever, that they be muzzled when in the field, and held with a leash while following the track of the enemy.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Brig. Gen. Z. TAYLOR,
Commanding Army of the South, Florida.

I now ask to read the following resolution, which also shall make a part of my speech:

Mr. ADAMS submitted the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to report to this House the natural, political, and martial history of the bloodhounds, showing the peculiar fitness of that class of warriors to be the associates of the gallant army of the United States, specifying the nice discrimination of his scent between the blood of the freeman and the blood of the slave—between the blood of the armed warrior and that of women or children—between the blood of the black, white, and colored men—between the blood of savage Seminoles and that of the Anglo-Saxon pious Christian. Also, a statement of the number of bloodhounds and their conductors, imported by this Government, or by the authorities of Florida, from the Island of Cuba, and the cost of that importation. Also, whether a further importation of the same heroic race into the State of Maine, to await the contingency of a contested Northeastern boundary question, is contemplated, or only to set an example to be followed by our possible adversary in the event of a conflict. Whether measures have been taken to secure exclusively to ourselves the employment of this auxiliary force, and whether he deems it expedient to extend to the said bloodhounds and their posterity the benefit of the pension laws.

Mr. Boyd demanded the yeas and nays on the passage of the resolution; which were ordered.

Mr. ADAMS said, inasmuch as the yeas and nays were ordered, he would wish to explain before the question was taken.

The resolution, in consequence, was laid over under the rule.

Sir, if any other member than the venerable gentleman from Massachusetts had offered this resolution, I would have thought him a fit subject for the dark cell of a lunatic asylum. Or if his reason was evidently so as to prevent such a conclusion, and knowing that he had read the communication of the Secretary of War, (a document which has been lying on our desks for some weeks,) I would have thought he was wilfully, designedly, and maliciously, attempting to practice a base fraud upon the

American people, and a vile slander upon the Administration.

I presume it is not the intention of the Secretary of War to enrol the Spanish bloodhounds of Florida with the pension soldiers of the Revolution. When the time comes that dogs must be enrolled with men, I can tell you a list on which they will be placed. I mean the black list. The list of those who violated the Constitution, tramp'd upon the sacred rights of the American people, and debased the purity of the elective franchise in 1824, by the appointment of a man to the highest and most responsible office known to our Government, who was not of the people's choice.

It is a principle in ethics and philosophy, that there is a time and place for every thing; and it is a principle in propriety that every thing should be in its place. If dogs are to be enrolled with men, let them be enrolled with those who have disgraced their stations and dishonored their Government. But let patriots be enrolled with patriots.

If the solicitude manifested on the subject of the employment of bloodhounds in Florida be not the result of morbid humanity and Christian sympathy, or the whining, pining, sniffing cants of hypocrisy and demagoguism, when had it its beginning?

I ask your attention while I read the conclusion of a proclamation of the pious Governor of Pennsylvania in 1764, and also the conclusion of the ordinance of the court, and the proclamation of his Excellency, William Shirley, Governor of the puritans of Massachusetts, still more celebrated for their piety, in 1744, at a time when piety held so high a seat that the man who would so far forget himself as to kiss his wife on Sunday, was subject to the payment of a heavy fine, and, for aught I know, corporeal punishment. But here are the extracts:

"AND WHEREAS, it is necessary for the better carrying on offensive Operations against our Indian Enemies, and bringing the unhappy war with them to a speedy issue, that the greatest Encouragement should be given to all His Majesty's Subjects to exert and use their utmost endeavors to pursue, attack, take and destroy our said Enemy Indians; I DO HEREBY DECLARE AND PROMISE, That there shall be paid, out of the Moneys lately granted for His Majesty's Use, to all and every Person and Persons not in the Pay of this Province, the following several and respective PREMIUMS and BOUNTIES for the PRISONERS and SCALPS of the enemy Indians, that shall be taken or killed within the Bounds of this Province, as limited by the Royal Charter, or in Pursuit from within the said Bounds; that is to say,

"For every MALE INDIAN ENEMY, above Ten Years old, who shall be taken Prisoner, and delivered at any Forts garrisoned by the Troops in the Pay of this Province, or at any of the

County Towns, to the Keeper of the Common Gaols there, the Sum of ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY SPANISH DOLLARS, or PIECES OF EIGHT.

"For every FEMALE INDIAN ENEMY, taken Prisoner and brought in as aforesaid; and for every MALE INDIAN ENEMY, of Ten Years old or under, taken Prisoner and delivered as aforesaid, the Sum of ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY PIECES OF EIGHT.

"For the SCALP of every MALE INDIAN ENEMY, and above the age of Ten Years, produced as evidence of their being killed, the Sum of ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOUR PIECES OF EIGHT. And

"For the SCALP of every FEMALE INDIAN ENEMY above the age of Ten Years, produced as evidence of their being killed, the Sum of FIFTY PIECES OF EIGHT.

"AND that there shall be paid to every Officer or Officers, Soldier or Soldiers, as are or shall be in the Pay of this Province, who shall take, bring in, and produce, any INDIAN ENEMY PRISONER or SCALP, as aforesaid, ONE HALF of the said several and respective PREMIUMS and BOUNTIES

"Given under my hand and Great Seal of the said Province, at Philadelphia, the Seventh day of July, in the Fourth year of His Majesty's Reign, and in the reign of our LORD one thousand seven hundred and Sixty-Four.

JOHN PENN.

By His Honour's Command.
JOSEPH SHIPPEN, junior, Secretary.
GOD Save the KING."

So much for pious Pennsylvania; now for the puritans.

"On the 26th of October last the General Court of this Province voted, that there shall be paid out of the public Treasury, to any Company, party, or person singly, of his Majesty's subjects belonging to or residing within this Province, who shall voluntarily, and at their own proper cost and charge, go out and kill a male Indian of the age of twelve years or upwards, of the tribe of St. Johns or Cape Sables, after the twenty-sixth day of October last past, and before the last day of June, anno Domini one thousand seven hundred and forty-five, (or for such part of that term as the War shall continue,) in any place to the Eastward of a line to be fixed by the Governor and His Majesty's Council of this Province, somewhere to the Eastward of Penobscot, and produce his scalp in evidence of his death, the sum of one hundred pounds in bills of credit of this Province of the New Tenor, and the sum of one hundred and five pounds in said bills for any male of the like age who shall be taken Captive, and delivered to the Order of the Captain-General to be at disposal and for the use of the Government; and the sum of fifty pounds in said bills, for women; and the like sum for children under the age of twelve years killed in fight; and fifty five pounds for such of them as shall be taken prisoners, together with the plunder.

And upon the second day of November instant, His Excellency, with the advice and consent of the Council, issued a proclamation for giving public notice of the said encouragement; where in they have also fixed the line (to the Eastward of which the said Indians may be slain or taken, or made prisoners) which line is to begin on the sea shore at three leagues distance eastwardly from the Easternmost part of the mouth of Passamaquoddy river, and thence to run North into the country through the Province of Nova Scotia to the river St. Lawrence.

Sir, I would like to comment on these extracts, but I must leave that to those who may read them, for I have already consumed too much of the time of the committee. Permit me to conclude, by returning my sincere thanks for the patience and attention with which I have been heard.



